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This paper discusses secure methods to conduct e-voting over a blockchain in three different settings: decentralized voting,
centralized remote voting and centralized polling station voting. These settings cover almost all voting scenarios that occur in
practice. A proof-of-concept implementation for decentralized voting over Ethereum’s blockchain is presented. This work
demonstrates the suitable use of a blockchain not just as a public bulletin board, but more importantly, as a trustworthy
computing platform that enforces the correct execution of the voting protocol in a publicly verifiable manner. We also discuss
scaling up a blockchain-based voting application for national elections. We show that for national-scale elections the major
verifiability problems can be addressed without having to depend on any blockchain. However, a blockchain remains a viable
option to realize a public bulletin board, which has the advantage of being a “preventive” measure to stop retrospective
changes on previously published records as opposed to a “detective” measure like the use of mirror websites.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Secure voting methods underpin the integrity of democracy. In paper-based voting, tallying is a critical process
where the winner is determined. Yet it is also the most vulnerable stage whereby a lack of transparency will allow
tallying authorities (TAs) to (whether mistakenly or maliciously) modify, miscount or exclude a voter’s ballot
without their knowledge. A common countermeasure is to arrange public supervision attended by independent
observers in the physical tallying procedure in the hope that any wrongdoing by the TAs would be observed and
recorded.
In the digital era, there has been a trend of moving voting towards using electronic means, e.g., by using a
touch-screen Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machine at polling stations or casting votes from home through
the Internet. However, when tallying is done electronically, hacking an election becomes much easier since it
only takes flipping a few bits in the electronic tally to alter an election outcome. The traditional countermeasure
through public supervision is no longer applicable when all votes are tallied in the computer memory. If there is
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a bug in the tallying software, or a hacker who has access to modify the software, the electronic tally or ballots
can be changed without anyone knowing.
But digital technology is not all doom and gloom; it also brings new opportunities to secure an election in
ways that were not possible with traditional paper ballots. For example, the use of digital technology, combined
with cryptography, facilitates the design of voting systems that are publicly verifiable. Verifiability is typically
defined as follows:
(1) Cast-as-intended: a voter is able to verify that their intended candidate is correctly captured in the cast
vote.
(2) Recorded-as-cast: a voter is able to verify that their cast vote is correctly recorded by the system.
(3) Tallied-as-recorded: a voter (or any observer) is able to verify that all recorded votes are tallied correctly.
Voting systems that satisfy the above three properties are called end-to-end (E2E) verifiable [7]. In an E2E
voting system, public verifiability is realized by the use of a receipt, which is provided to the voter after a voting
session is finished. The receipt enables a voter to verify the integrity of the entire voting process, but does not
allow the voter to prove to third parties how they have voted [10, 24]. Hence, voter privacy is also preserved
in an E2E system. By comparison, traditional paper voting can only satisfy the first property – a voter marks
a chosen candidate on a physical ballot with confidence that the ballot will be cast-as-intended. However, they
cannot verify by themselves whether their cast ballots will be correctly recorded and tallied. Due to human error,
malice or mischance, cast ballots may be lost or miscounted as reported before [14].
E-voting protocols that support public verifiability normally assume the existence of a public bulletin board
that provides a consistent view to all voters. In practice, an example of implementing the public bulletin board
can be seen in the yearly elections of the International Association of Cryptologic Research (IACR) [9]. They used
the Helios voting system [1] whose bulletin board is implemented as a single web server. This server is trusted to
provide a consistent view to all voters, however the server may misbehave if it is dishonest or compromised.
Many believe that blockchain, a public ledger that underpins the popular cryptocurrecies such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum, holds the key to solving some key problems in e-voting. In practice, companies such as VoteWatcher
(votewatcher.com), FollowMyVote (followmyvote.com) have proposed solutions that publish votes on a blockchain
in plaintext. However, these solutions trivially reveal interim results before the end of voting, which can have an
undesirable impact on voting behaviour.
In this paper, we investigate secure methods of running an election over a blockchain. Our contributions are
as follows. First, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of secure e-voting over a blockchain for all three
types of e-voting systems that cover decentralized boardroom voting, centralized internet voting and centralized
polling station voting. Second, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of decentralized boardroom voting
using Ethereum’s blockchain to demonstrate the feasibility. Third, we discuss scaling up the implementation for
national elections and highlight open research problems.
A preliminary conference version of the paper that reports a smart-contract implementation of decentralized
boardroom voting over a blockchain is presented in [20]. This journal paper extends the previous conference
paper by covering centralized remote voting and centralized polling station voting in addition to decentralized
voting. The content of this paper forms the basis of a technical report that was submitted to the Economist
Cybersecurity Challenge jointly organized by the Economist and Kaspersky Lab, and was ranked third place [15].
2 BACKGROUND
This section reviews the state-of-the-art in e-voting research and discusses the potential combination with a
blockchain such as one that is currently being used by Ethereum.
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Fig. 1. Categorization of e-voting systems
2.1 Categorization of e-voting
Depending on how an election is organized, an e-voting system can be categorized into two types (see Figure 1).
The first type is decentralized voting. In this setting, the election is essentially run by voters themselves. Votes
are cast over a distributed network in several rounds before the final tally can be computed by every voter.
Due to requiring multiple rounds of interaction, such systems are only suitable for small-scale elections, e.g.,
boardroom voting. Examples of existing voting systems include Kiayias-Yung [19], Groth [8] and Open Vote
Network (OV-net) of Hao, Ryan and Zielínski [11]. Among the three, OV-net is the most efficient in terms of
the number of rounds, computational efficiency and bandwidth usage. It only requires 2 rounds, fewer than
other schemes. Within each round, each voter only needs to broadcast one group element, together with one
zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) to prove that the published group element is well-formed. This is close to the best
efficiency that one may hope for. We will discuss more details on OV-net in Section 4.
The second type is centralized voting. This corresponds to almost all practical large-scale elections where
central administrations are involved. Depending on the implementation, a central facility is used to collect votes:
it may be DRE machines in polling stations or a web server in Internet voting. The state-of-the-art research in
the centralized setting includes voting systems that are End-to-End (E2E) verifiable. These systems can be further
divided into centralized remote voting and centralized polling station voting. Examples of existing E2E voting
systems include Adder [18], Civitas [6], Helios [2] and DRE-i [10] for centralized remote voting, and Votegrity [4],
MarkPledge [22], Scantegrity [5], Prêt à Voter [23], STAR-vote [3] and DRE-ip [24] for centralized polling station
voting. Among these systems, DRE-i and DRE-ip are the only two systems that are E2E verifiable without any
TAs; they are also known as self-enforcing e-voting (SEEV) systems [10, 24]. An internet voting system using
DRE-i has been used for classroom voting and student prize competitions [9]. A touch-screen based polling
station voting system using DRE-ip was trialed in Gateshead, United Kingdom, on 2 May 2019 during the UK
local elections with positive voter feedback [12].
It is worth nothing that in the centralized setting, whether an E2E voting system is used for local polling
station voting or remote internet voting is mostly an implementation detail. Many E2E systems can be deployed
for both with some adaptions. For example, although Helios was proposed and implemented as an Internet voting
system, it is also possible to use it for polling station voting, e.g., by installing a browser-like voting client in
the voting booth. Similarly, although the DRE-ip protocol has been implemented and trialled for polling station
voting [12], the same protocol can be implemented for Internet voting as well.
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2.2 Public bulletin board
All the protocols in Figure 1 require a public bulletin board that provides a consistent view to all voters. The
publication of data on the bulletin board should be append-only; if published data are retrospectively changed,
assurance on the integrity of the tallying results would be lost. However, a secure implementation of the bulletin
board is a non-trivial challenge. The use of a single server for the bulletin board, as in the implementation
of Helios [1], DRE-i [9] and DRE-ip [24], has the risk that if the server is dishonest or compromised, it might
retrospectively modify the published data without being noticed. To address this issue, the published data should
also be replicated in mirrored websites (which may be maintained by volunteers in distributed geographic
locations). Thus, besides changing data on its own site, a dishonest server also needs to modify copies of data in
mirrored sites. This is a lot harder, and can easily be detected by the public.
An alternative approach is by leveraging a blockchain. The purpose of a blockchain is to synchronize a set of
replicated ledgers kept by mutually distrustful peers such that all peers reach consensus on the public ledger’s
contents. At first glance, Bitcoin’s blockchain is a potentially attractive candidate for an e-voting public bulletin
board as it is censorship-resistant with an immutability property that prevents data modification once it is stored.
Unfortunately, Bitcoin’s limited programming capability makes it difficult to enforce the voting protocol’s correct
execution. This critical limitation makes us turn to Ethereum.
2.3 Ethereum
Among several competing blockchain systems, Ethereum’s blockchain seems the most promising as a platform for
an e-voting bulletin board. Ethereum is the second most popular cryptocurrency with a $40.6 market capitalization
as of November 2020. Its blockchain is considered an ordered transaction-based state machine. Programs (‘smart
contracts’) can be stored and executed over the blockchain using user-authorized transactions.
Above all, smart contracts offer an expressive programming language that allows us to directly implement our
e-voting protocol using cryptography. The execution of these contracts is enforced by consensus computing as
every validating peer in Ethereum’s underlying peer-to-peer network must repeat its execution to reach consensus
on the blockchain’s contents. Once data is published on a blockchain, the chance that it will be retrospectively
modified decreases exponentially after more blocks are appended. As compared to the detective measure as seen
in mirrored website, a blockchain potentially provides a preventive measure to stop data being modified in the
first place. Furthermore, each peer in the Ethereum network has built-in computing facility to perform publicly
verifiable operations. As such, Ethereum offers more than just a bulletin board as its consensus protocol can also
enforce the correct execution of an e-voting protocol.
3 A HIGH-LEVEL VISION
The role of trustworthy authorities in ensuring the tallying integrity of an election exists in many voting systems.
In traditional paper-based voting, after the voter puts the ballot into the box, they lose possession of the ballot
and need to trust election authorities to faithfully record and tally votes. A chain of custody is required to ensure
the integrity of the paper ballots during the collection, transportation and counting processes. Despite this, there
are still many cases of missing or miscounted paper ballots reported in the past [14]. Today, e-voting products
such as DREs used in USA, India, Brazil and many other countries mostly work like a blackbox and the public
cannot independently verify the tallying results. This requires even stronger trust on authorities to assure the
integrity of system, e.g., through the government certification process.
Over the past two decades, researchers have proposed to apply cryptography to build voting systems that are
end-to-end verifiable. Mimicking the role of trusted authorities in paper-based counting, most of the proposed
E2E voting systems assume tallying authorities (TAs), who are trustworthy individuals with computing and
cryptography expertise to perform the tallying operation. However, voters must trust the TAs do not collude all
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Fig. 2. A vision of removing trusted tallying authorities
together as a full collusion will allow TAs to trivially learn every individual vote. The fact that TAs have such
power can present a deterring effect on some voters for the concern on privacy. In a real-world election, besides
TAs, there are other authorities in various roles, e.g., those who are responsible for setting up ballot choices,
registering voters and performing voter authentication. However, finding and managing tallying authorities
in a secure and distributed manner has proved particularly difficult, as reported in real-life experience of trial
elections [2].
The recent works on E2E e-voting systems [10, 24] show, counter-intuitively, that E2E verifiability is achievable
without involving TAs; in other words, an e-voting system can be “self-enforcing”. Such TA-free voting systems
are unimaginable with the traditional paper-based methods, but become possible thanks to the digital technologies.
We thus envision that “self-enforcing e-voting” systems will play an important role in future elections. This
vision is highlighted in Figure 2.
One important factor for the popularization of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is attributed to their decen-
tralized blockchain, which as a public ledger is free from control by central banks or financial institutions. In
other words, a blockchain is self-enforcing. The philosophy of removing trusted authorities in maintaining the
public ledger in Bitcoin echoes that of removing trusted authorities in administrating the tallying process in
self-enforcing e-voting systems. The two technologies appear to fit naturally.
Hence, we set out to explore the feasibility of running self-enforcing e-voting protocols over a self-enforcing
blockchain. Running a self-enforcing e-voting system over a blockchain has several advantages. First, instead of
simply publishing the voting data as a bulletin board, a blockchain provides a trustworthy computing platform to
verify the data in real-time. Thus any malformed cryptographic data can be caught instantly, which effectively
turns the traditional detection measure in E2E voting systems into a prevention measure. Second, blockchain
makes it possible to automate the execution of a voting protocol in a timely and verifiable manner through smart
contracts. Finally, blockchain supports a deposit-and-refund mechanism that can be built into the smart contract
as an incentive to encourage honest behavoiur of all parties involved in the voting. In the next section, we will
present a proof-of-concept implementation to further demonstrate these advantages.
4 BOARDROOM VOTING AND IMPLEMENTATION
We start by studying the simplest setting: decentralized voting for a small-scale boardroom election. In this
setting, we implement the OV-net protocol over Ethereum as a smart contract. This is the first implementation of
a boardroom voting protocol with maximum voter privacy over Ethereum’s blockchain.
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4.1 Open Vote Network Protocol
Open Vote Network (OV-net) is a decentralized two-round voting scheme [11]. It is self-tallying, meaning that
every voter is able to tally votes by themselves. Voter privacy is protected at the maximum as each voter is limited
to learn nothing more than their own input and the total tally. The protocol assumes a public authenticated
channel for every voter to cast votes.
For a single candidate election with a Yes/No choice, the protocol can be described as follows (a single-candidate
election can be easily generalized to support multiple candidates [11]). First, all n voters agree on (G,д) where G
is a cyclic group of prime order q, and д is a generator in G. All modular operations are performed with respect
to a large prime modulus p, where q | p − 1. Each voter Pi chooses a secret value xi uniformly at random from
[0,q − 1].
Round 1: every voter Pi publishes дxi and a Schnorr Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) for proving the knowledge
of xi . At the end of this round, every voter validates all ZKPs, and computes: дyi = Πj<iдx j /Πj>iдx j .
Round 2: every voter Pi publishes дxiyiдvi and a one-out-of-two ZKP for proving that vi is either 0 or 1 (for
No and Yes respectively). At the end of this round, anyone who observes the protocol can tally the number of Yes
votes by computing: Πiдxiyiдvi = дΣixiyiдΣivi = дΣivi .
The above protocol works based on the cancellation of random factors at the tallying phase, i.e., for any set
of xi , when yi is defined as yi = Σj<ix j − Σj>ix j (as per Round 1), we have Σixiyi = 0. From дΣivi , anyone can
compute the tally Σiv by exhaustive search. No tallying authorities are required.
In this protocol, all communication is public. No secret channels between voters is required. This makes it
suitable for implementation over Ethereum, as we explain below.
4.2 Structure of Implementation
The implementation of OV-net over Ethereum consists of two smart contracts, which are both written in
Ethereum’s Solidity language. The first contract is called the voting contract. It implements the voting protocol,
controls the election process and verifies the two types of zero knowledge proofs. The second contract is called the
cryptography contract. It distributes the code for creating the two types of zero knowledge proofs. This provides
all voters with the same cryptography code that can be used locally without interacting with the Ethereum
network. The code for both contracts is freely available as open source1. Three HTML5/JavaScript pages are
developed in this implementation:
• Election administrator (via admin.html) administers the election. This includes establishing the list of
eligible voters, setting the election question, and activating a list of timers to ensure the election progresses
in a timely manner. The latter includes notifying Ethereum to begin/close registration, to begin/close voting
and to compute the tally.
• Voter (via vote.html) can register for an election, and once registered can cast their vote.
• Observer (via livefeed.html) can watch the election’s progress, including the election administrator
starting and closing each stage and voters registering and casting votes. The running tally is not computable
until the last vote is cast, due to the cryptographic design of the protocol.
It is assumed that voters and the election administrator have their own Ethereum accounts. TheWeb3 framework
provided by the Ethereum Foundation is used to facilitate communication between a user’s web browser and
their Ethereum client. The user can unlock their Ethereum account (decrypt their Ethereum private key using a
password) and authorize transactions directly from the web browser. There is no need for the user to interact
with an Ethereum wallet and the Ethereum client can run in the background as a daemon.
1https://github.com/stonecoldpat/anonymousvoting
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Fig. 3. Five election stages in the Open Vote Network
4.3 Election stages
The protocol is executed in five stages as shown in Figure 3. A list of timers is enforced by the smart contract to
ensure that the election progresses in a timely manner. The contract only allows eligible voters to register for an
election, and only registered voters can cast a vote. Furthermore, the contract can require each voter to deposit
ether (the internal network currency in Ethereum) upon registration, and automatically refund the ether when
their vote is accepted into the blockchain. Each stage of the election is described in detail below.
SETUP. The election administrator authenticates each voter with their user-controlled account and updates
the voting contract to include a whitelist of accounts as eligible voters. The administrator then defines a list of
timers to ensure that the election progresses in a timely manner in subsequent stages. Finally, the administrator
sets the registration deposit, the voting question, whether the optional COMMIT stage should be enabled, and
notifies Ethereum to transit to the next stage.
SIGNUP. All eligible voters can choose to register for the vote after reviewing the voting question and other
parameters set by the election administrator. To sign up, the voter sends the first round OV-net data to Ethereum
alongside a deposit. The election administrator is responsible for notifying Ethereum to transit to either the
optional COMMIT or the VOTE stage. All дyi are computed by Ethereum during the transition.
COMMIT (optional). All voters publish a hash of the second round data of OV-net to Ethereum as a commitment.
The contract automatically transits to the VOTE stage once the final commitment is accepted into the blockchain.
VOTE. All voters publish the second round OV-net data. The deposit is automatically refunded to the voter
when their vote is accepted by Ethereum. The election administrator notifies Ethereum to compute the tally once
the final vote is cast.
TALLY. Ethereum computes the tally and posts it on the blockchain.
Note that the last voter in round 2 of OV-net can compute the tally before others [11], and depending on the
computed outcome, might change their vote. The optional COMMIT stage addresses this issue by requiring all
voters to commit to their votes before revealing them in the VOTE stage. The deposit in this implementation
provides a financial incentive for registered voters to vote and is returned to the voter upon successfully casting
their vote. The timestamps defined by the election administrator determine if the voter’s deposit is forfeited or
refunded. Forfeited deposits may go directly to selected charities, which are specified in the smart contract.
4.4 Experiments on Ethereum’s test network
The proof-of-concept implementationwas deployed on Ethereum’s official test network thatmimics the production
network. There were 126 transactions sent to simulate forty voters participating in this protocol. In the actual
deployment, the implementation had to be split into two contracts as the code was too large to store in an
Ethereum block. The voting contract VoteCon (80% of block capacity and $0.83 transaction fee) contains the
protocol logic. The cryptography contract CryptoCon (52% of block capacity and $0.54 transaction fee) contains
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the code to create and verify the two types of zero knowledge proofs in the protocol. Note that creating the ZKPs
is run locally on the voter’s machine.
4.5 Cost analysis
A breakdown of costs for 40 participants using OV-net is summarized in Table 1. The cost in USD ($) is approxi-
mated using the conversion rate of 1 ether = $11 and 1 gas = 0.00000002 ether (the rates when the experiments
were conducted). Here a gas is a unit that measures the amount of computation required to execute certain
operations over the Ethereum blockchain.
Overall, running the election with 40 voters costs the election administrator $2.74. The total election cost
is $31.98, which breaks down to a cost of $0.73 per voter. As the number of voters increases, the election
administrator’s cost increases linearly, while the voter’s cost remains constant. The total cost averaged over the
number of voters stays approximately the same.
Entity: Transaction Cost in Gas Cost in $
A: VoteCon 3, 779, 963 0.83
A: CryptoCon 2, 435, 848 0.54
A: Eligible 2, 153, 461 0.47
A: Begin Signup 234, 984 0.05
V: Register 763, 118 0.17
A: Begin Election 3, 085, 449 0.68
V: Commit 70, 112 0.02
V: Vote 2, 490, 412 0.55
A: Tally 746, 485 0.16
Administrator Total 12, 436, 190 2.74
Voter Total 3, 323, 642 0.73
Election Total 145, 381, 858 31.98
Table 1. A breakdown of the costs for 40 participants using OV-net. The cost for the election administrator is identified as
‘A’ and the voter as ‘V’.
4.6 Timing analysis
Table 2 outlines the timing measurements for operations in OV-net. All measurements were performed on a
MacBook Pro running OS X with 4 cores, 2.3 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16 GB RAM, and are rounded up to the next
whole millisecond. Computation times for all tasks are measured on the local daemon. Overall, ZKP operations
are the most computationally expensive components in the protocol execution.
4.7 Limitations
While our proof-of-concept implementation shows that it is feasible to run small-scale boardroom voting in
a decentralized setting over a blockchain, there are a few limitations. First, since each voter uses their own
computer to generate secret keys, they naturally need to trust their own computing device. For example, if the
device is compromised, the voter may be presented with a misleading view. Also, if the secret key is not generated
uniformly at random, the guarantee on vote privacy will be lost. Second, if voters reveal the local secrets to a
third party (say a coercer), they can prove how they have voted. Third, each voter needs to have an Ethereum
account, and needs to pay a deposit (which will be refunded if the voter completes voting). However, ordinary
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Action Avg. Time (ms)
Create Schnorr ZKP 81
Register voting key 142
Begin election 277
Create 1-out-of-2 ZKP 461
Cast vote 573
Tally 132
Table 2. A time analysis for operations that run on the Ethereum daemon.
voters may not have an Ethereum account. Finally, if some voters refuse to send votes in the second round of
OV-net, they will lose their deposits, but the tally will fail to work. It is still possible to compute the tally by
adding a recovery round [16], however, a recovery operation requires all the remaining voters to cooperate all
together, and will fail if some drop out halfway in the recovery process. These are inherent limitations in a totally
decentralized voting system. They may be less an issue for small-scale voting in a boardroom, but can prove
problematic for national scale elections, which we will discuss next.
5 NATIONAL ELECTIONS
A number of researchers have investigated running a national election over a blockchain [13, 17, 25, 27]. Obviously,
running a national election is completely different from running decentralized boardroom voting since national
elections are inherently centralized. Almost all of the proposed solutions so far involve using a blockchain
as an immutable storage device to save digital ballots in plaintext. This is also what several companies (e.g.,
VoteWatcher, FollowMyVote) are proposing. However, as explained in a consensus study report published by
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine [21], storing ballots on a blockchain in plaintext
does not provide any ballot secrecy and as such the system is trivially subject to coercion and vote selling. The
report concludes: “The use of blockchains in an election scenario would do little to address the major security
requirements of voting, such as voter verifiability”. However, this report does not elaborate how the major security
requirements of voting can be met in a national election. Here we further investigate this subject from a system’s
perspective with the blockchain being one possible part of the system. This allows us to study how the verifiablity
requirements can be fulfilled in a national election and the exact role that a blockchain might play in the overall
system.
To start with, one may ask whether we can apply the proof-of-concept implementation in Section 4 to larger-
scale elections such as national elections. Unfortunately, a straightforward application will not work for two
reasons. First, the OV-net protocol that underpins our implementation is designed for decentralized voting, while
national elections are inherently centralized. The protocol requires several rounds of interactions among voters,
which may not be an issue in boardroom voting, but is not realistic in larger elections. In a national election, a
voter should just be able to cast a vote without having to interact with other voters. Second, using Ethereum as
deployed today, only one vote can be cast in each block due to reaching the block’s gas limit. Given that each
block is generated every 12 seconds, this means only five votes per minute can be cast over the blockchain. This
may be sufficient for boardroom voting, but is inadequate for national elections. Take the 2016 UK referendum as
an example. For 5.2 million postal votes in that election, it would require 722 days for all votes to be recorded
into Ethereum’s blockchain. Supporting a national election requires addressing these two major limitations
accordingly.
To address the first problem, a centralized e-voting protocol should be used instead of OV-net. Depending
on whether the voting environment is “supervised” or not, there are two settings: centralized remote voting
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(“unsupervised”) and centralized polling station voting (“supervised”). In general, E2E verifiability is a standard
requirement for secure voting protocols in both settings. We refer the reader to an edited book on “ Real-World
Electronic Voting” [7] for a review of the existing E2E e-voting protocols and testing in real-world elections. While
many of the E2E protocols are applicable, we choose DRE-ip [24]. As compared with other related E2E protocols,
DRE-ip does not involve any TAs, and hence is much simpler and more efficient to manage. As compared with
DRE-i [10], DRE-ip computes encrypted ballots in real time rather than pre-computing ballots before an election
as in DRE-i, and as such provides a higher privacy guarantee than DRE-i – in case the voting system is completely
compromised, the information leakage will be limited to only the partial tally at the time of compromise, which
is minimum. The same DRE-ip protocol can be implemented for both local polling station voting and remote
Internet voting [24].
To overcome the second problem, a dedicated blockchain will likely be needed as the throughput of the existing
Ethereum’s blockchain is not scalable enough for a national election. As an example, if we choose DRE-ip to
provide E2E verifiability in large-scale elections, the voting system will need to publish encrypted ballots on a
public bulletin board to enable public verifiability. A blockchain is one way to implement such a public bulletin
board and to ensure that published data cannot be retrospectively changed. Creating a dedicated blockchain with
high throughput (e.g., larger blocks, faster rates) for a national election is theoretically possible but a harder
problem is creating an ecosystem in which a sufficiently large number of distributed miners are incentivized to
mine blocks and maintain the blockchain. An alternative way to implement a public bulletin board is by using
mirrored websites, where encrypted ballots are published at an election website and mirrored on other websites
in distributed places. This follows a similar practice of distributing software over the Internet by using mirror
websites. The main difference between the two approaches is that a blockchain can be seen as a “preventive”
measure to stop modification of data by design, while the use of mirrored websites can be seen as a “detective”
measure.
6 COMPARISON
In this section, we compare our proposed voting methods with the real-world voting applications and related
voting schemes in the literature. For fairness, we compare systems within their respective settings. Table 3
summarizes the comparison results in terms of decentralized voting, centralized remote voting and centralized
polling station voting.
Decentralized voting. In this setting, voting is decentralized and there is no central facility to collect votes. A
classic example is a simple show of hands. Everyone can tally the votes, but voters have no privacy, and they
may be subject to coercion. Our proposal for this setting is to implement OV-net over blockchain, denoted
as OV-net/BC. OV-net is an e-voting protocol executed over a distributed network. It provides the maximum
protection on the voter’s privacy under the condition that a voter uses a trustworthy voting device [11]. With a
trustworthy voting device, a voter can verify that their vote is cast as intended and recorded as cast. The system
is self-tallying, so anyone can compute the tally without needing any tallying authorities. However, OV-net does
not offer coercion resistance. This is because voting is conducted in an unsupervised environment. A voter may
vote while a coercer is standing over their shoulder. A voter can also prove how they have voted by revealing
the ephemeral secrets cached on their computer. For this reason, OV-net/BC is only suitable for small-scale
boardroom voting.
Centralized remote voting. In this setting, votes are cast remotely into a central facility, which may be a specified
mailing address for postal voting, or a web server for centralized Internet voting. In postal voting, voter privacy
is typically protected by using double envelopes, where the outer envelope displays voter identifying information
for authentication while the inner one contains only the secret vote. In other words, the voter privacy is fulfilled
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Scheme Decentralized Centralized Centralized
(boardroom) voting remote voting polling station voting
Criteria Show of OV-net/BC
∗ Postal TA-based TA-free Paper DRE DRE+ TA-based TA-free
hands E2E/BB E2E/BB∗ VVPAT E2E/BB E2E/BB∗
Voter privacy ✗ V V V V V V V V V
Voter can check
if their vote is
cast as intended
✓ V ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Voter can check
if their vote is
recorded as cast
✓ V ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
Anyone can check
if all votes are
tallied as recorded
✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
Receipt does not
reveal voter’s choice N/A N/A N/A ✓ ✓ N/A N/A N/A ✓ ✓
Coercion resistant ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ V V V V V
Free from TA ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Suitable for
large-scale voting ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 3. Comparison between voting systems within respective settings. BC: Blockchain. BB: Bulletin Board. TA: Tallying
authority. ∗: Our proposed solution. Examples of TA-based E2E include Helios [2], Scantegrity [5], Votegrity [4], and Prêt à
Voter [23]. Examples of TA-free E2E (or self-enforcing e-voting) schemes include DRE-i [10] and DRE-ip [24]. In this paper,
we choose DRE-ip for both centralized remote voting and polling station voting. ✗: not fulfilled. ✓: fulfilled.V: fulfilled under
conditions. N/A: not applicable.
under the condition that the voter’s identity is not linked to the cast ballot (i.e., voting is anonymous). After the
voter posts the ballot, they cannot check if their vote will be recorded and tallied correctly. They need to trust
the integrity of the postal system and tallying authorities in the receiving end to correctly record and tally their
votes. Our proposal for this setting is to use E2E verifiable e-voting systems over a secure bulletin board (BB). A
BB may be implemented by a blockchain or mirror websites. Among E2E schemes, we choose DRE-ip as it is free
from tallying authorities and is simpler to manage. An E2E voting system, such as DRE-ip, is designed to protect
the tallying integrity even if the voting system is completely compromised. In an E2E voting system, the voter
privacy is generally protected by ensuring that each authenticated voter obtains a random credential not linked
to their real identity. In other words, the voter privacy is fulfilled under the condition that voting is anonymous.
An E2E voting system, by definition, allows a voter to verify their vote is cast as intended (CAI), recorded as
cast (RAC), and tallied as recorded (TAR). In DRE-ip (and other E2E systems), the E2E verifiability is realized
by issuing each voter a receipt, which allows the voter to verify CAI and RAC but without being able to prove
to any third party how they have voted. In practice, the voter receipt can be delivered by using SMS or email
(or printed on physical paper in a polling station) as long as it cannot be retrospectively changed by the voting
system. The verification on TAR can be performed by anyone who has access to the audit data published on
the public bulletin board. As the voting environment is “unsupervised”, all systems in this category are subject
to coercion (e.g., a coercer watches over a voter’s shoulder when they cast a vote), hence are only suitable for
elections where the threat of coercion is low.
Centralized polling station voting. In this setting, votes are cast in central polling stations in a supervised
environment. Traditional paper-based voting, though commonly perceived by the public as secure, do not allow
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voters to verify by themselves that their votes are correctly recorded as cast and tallied as recorded. Voters need
to trust third parties for the integrity of the recording and tallying process. A plain DRE-based voting system
is much worse, as the machine may record a different candidate than the intended one without the voter’s
knowledge. This issue can be addressed by adding a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), but the resultant
system still does not allow the voter to check by themselves if their vote is correctly recorded and tallied. Since
VVPAT leaves physical audit trail for the cast ballots, this makes it possible in principle to verify the electronic
tally by comparing it against the full audit trail or a subset of it (risk-limiting auditing [26]). This assumes that
the integrity of VVPAT is protected through a chain of custody, and more importantly, that the paper records
are actually checked. However, in practice, VVAPT is rarely checked. For example, states in the US only allow
checking VVPAT when there is evidence of fraud, which is a high bar (see the unsuccessful petitions asking to
verify VVPAT of certain e-voting machines following the 2016 US presidential election2.
In a polling station, the voter privacy is protected by ensuring that voting is anonymous in a private voting
booth. This requires appropriate physical and procedural measures in place to ensure the security of the polling
station. The requirement of a secure polling station applies to all voting methods in this setting. Our proposal is
to use DRE-ip over a secure bulletin board. As before, the use of a blockchain is one possible way to implement
a bulletin board. As compared with alternative E2E schemes such as Votegrity [4] and Prêt à Voter [23], our
proposal does not require any TAs, which contributes to greatly simplifying the election management. Same as
other E2E voting systems, DRE-ip guarantees the tallying integrity even if the voting machines are completely
compromised [24]. The E2E verifiability (CAI, RAC and TAR) is realized without having to trust the voting
system.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we systematically investigated running an election over a blockchain in three different settings:
namely, decentralized voting, centralized remote voting and centralized polling station voting. We proposed
solutions for each setting. In the decentralized voting setting, we presented a smart-contract implementation of
OV-net over Ethereum’s blockchain, and demonstrated the feasibility to run a small-scale boardroom election
using an existing Ethereum blockchain. In the centralized remote/onsite voting settings, we proposed to use an E2E
verifiable e-voting scheme, in particular DRE-ip, over a secure bulletin board. The use of a blockchain represents
one possible way to implement such a bulletin board. However, we showed that there was an alternative way of
using mirrored websites to implement a bulletin board. While a blockchain provides a “preventive” measure to
stop retrospective modification of data by design, the use of mirrored website provides a “detective” measure
with a different cost-benefit trade-off.
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